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Revisiting the 1929 Crisis: Was the Fed  
Pre-Keynesian? New Lessons from the Past 
Claude Diebolt, Antoine Parent & Jamel Trabelsi  
Abstract: »Eine erneuerte Lektüre der Krise von 1929: War die Fed Vor-
Keynesianisch? Neue Erkenntnisse aus der Vergangenheit«. This article is or-
ganized as follows: in section 1, we discuss the Bordo et al. (2002) monetarist 
counterfactual analysis. Section 2 presents data. In section 3, we address the 
following question: referring to Keynes’ definition of liquidity trap, we ask 
ourselves whether there were episodes of liquidity trap over the pre and post 
1929 crisis period and whether the Fed modified its reaction function in conse-
quence? Following this, in section 4 and using a SVAR approach, we simulate 
how US economic activity would have reacted following an expansionary 
monetary policy after the 1929 crisis. In conclusion, we suggest a renewed 
monetary lesson from the past. 
Keywords: 1929, crisis, Fed, Pre-Keynesian, cliometrics. 
Introduction 
A much debated hypothesis about the Great Depression of the thirties is Fried-
man and Schwartz’s (1963) contention that a severe but not unusual recession 
turned into the greatest contraction of all times because the Federal Reserve 
(Fed) failed to undertake expansionary open-market operations. They could 
have offset a drastic decline in the stock of money attributable to a series of 
banking panics.  
Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (2002) implemented a counterfactual analy-
sis in order to test Friedman and Schwartz’s proposition. They give evidence, 
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in a monetarist framework, that nothing prevented the US, the largest country 
in the world with massive gold reserves, from using expansionary policy to 
offset banking panics, deflation and declining economic activity. Simulations, 
based on a monetarist model of a large open economy, indicate that expansion-
ary open market operations by the Fed at two critical junctures – Oct. 1930 to 
Feb. 1931 and Sept. 1931 to Jan. 1932 – would have been successful in avert-
ing the banking panic that occurred. Had expansionary open market purchases 
been conducted in the 1930s, the contraction would not have led to the interna-
tional crises that followed.  
Nonetheless, the outcomes of Bordo et al. (2002) depend on the monetarist 
framework used. One could argue that their picture forgets that the Great De-
pression may have been characterized by a situation of liquidity trap (Keynes 
1936) which would have annihilated the positive impact of expansionary mone-
tary policy on economic growth at that time. The purpose of our article is to 
attempt to clarify the supposed lessons of the Great Depression. The issue – the 
absolute relevance of expansionary monetary policy even in a context of liquid-
ity trap – needs to be considered and tested in order to appreciate any possible 
errors in the lessons drawn from the past, as well as in monetary policy re-
sponses.  
Our article is organized as follows: in section 1, we discuss the Bordo et al. 
(2002) monetarist counterfactual analysis. Section 2 presents data. In section 3, 
we address the following question: referring to Keynes’ definition of liquidity 
trap, we ask ourselves whether there were episodes of liquidity trap over the 
pre and post 1929 crisis period and whether the Fed modified its reaction func-
tion in consequence? We give empirical evidence of episodes of liquidity trap 
in 1929. In the aftermath of 1929, we highlight that the Fed adopted a new 
policy rule “avoiding the trap” as early as 1930 which lasted until 1933. This 
point contrasts with the existing literature. Following this, in section 4 and 
using a SVAR approach, we simulate how US economic activity would have 
reacted following an expansionary monetary policy after the 1929 crisis. We 
give empirical evidence that expansionary monetary policy would not have 
been the path towards economic recovery in the USA. In conclusion, we sug-
gest a renewed monetary lesson from the past. 
1. Monetarist Counterfactual Approach  
of the 1929 Crisis by Bordo et al. 
Counterfactual analysis is one of the cornerstones of the cliometric methodol-
ogy (Costa, Diebolt and Demeulemeester 2007; Carlos 2010; Demeulemeester 
and Diebolt 2007; Fogel 1964; Williamson 1974). It is used to measure the 
deviation between what actually happened and what could have happened 
under different circumstances. This methodological principle is based on the 
measurement of the influence of a given factor upon a development by using 
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the difference between the development actually observed and the hypothetical 
development that would have been observed if the factor in question had not 
existed.  
The monetarist model developed by Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (2002) 
is a two-country model to determine US gold flows and to simulate the US gold 
reserves under alternative monetary policies.  
The authors assume that the US demand for money in period t is given by: 
mt-pt=αo+α1yt൅α2it+vt, α1>0, α2<0   (1) 
where, mt, pt, yt represent logs of money stock, price level and real income, it, 
denotes the interest rate and vt is the error term. The determinants of mt are 
expressed by the two following identities: 
mt≡μt+log(Ht)   (2) 
 
Ht=Gt+Dt     (3) 
where μt is the log of the money multiplier while, Ht, Gt, Dt represent high-
powered money, gold reserves and domestic credit.  
Using (1)-(3) and considering, 
ܪt=(Ht+Ht-1ሻ / 2 
It comes in first differences (Δ) that: 
ΔGt/ܪt=-ΔDt/ t-Δμt+Δpt+α1Δyt+α2Δit+Δvt   (4) 
Equation (4) can be utilized to examine the effect of an expansion in domestic 
credit on gold flows. Although the direct effect of ΔDt on ΔGt equals -1 in (4), 
ΔDt could also exert an indirect effect through other variables on the right hand 
side of (4). Over a very short period, (1 month), the authors assume that 
Δμt, Δpt, Δyt, Δvt are exogenous to ΔDt and Δit is the only potential channel for 
the indirect effect. The authors model the monetary relations in the rest of the 
world to explore this channel. Assuming that the money demand function in the 
rest of the world is of the same form as (1), representing the determinants of 
money stocks by identities similar to (2) et (3), we obtain: 
∆Gt*/Ht* ≡ െ∆Dt*/ܪ௧∗ െ ∆μt* ൅ ∆pt* ൅ α1*∆yt* ൅ α2*∆it* ൅ ∆vt*  (5) 
where these variables are expressed in foreign-currency units. Assuming that 
the world stock of gold is fixed and the US price of gold is constant over time, 
this implies that gold flows in the US and in the rest of the world are linked as 
follows:  
ΔGt=-Δ(etGt
*)             (6) 
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where et denotes the exchange rate in representing the price of foreign currency 
in US dollars. The relationship between interest rates in the US and abroad is 
expressed as follows: 
it=it
*+xt+εt        (7) 
where xt denotes the expected rate of US dollar depreciation and εt represents 
departures from perfect capital mobility (or uncovered parity) caused by factors 
such as risk premiums, transaction costs, information gaps and capital controls. 
If the gold standard had operated smoothly, no changes in gold parities would 
have been expected and xt=0. In this case, the Fed would still have been able to 
affect the interest rate differential it-it
*, if departures from perfect capital mobil-
ity allowed it to systematically influence εt. However, even if the Fed was 
unable to affect the interest rate differential, the size of the US would have 
enabled it to influence the world interest rate and hence follow an independent 
monetary policy under the gold standard.  
Using (4), (5), (6) and the first-difference form of (7), one obtains:  
ΔGt/ܪt=θtൣ-ΔDt/ܪt-Δμ௧+Δpt+α1Δyt+α2ሺΔxt+Δεtሻ+Δvt൧ 
൅ሺθtα2/α2*ሻ൫ΔDt*/ܪt*+Δμt*-Δpt*-α1Δyt*-Δvt*+γt൯ 
where θt≡α2*etܪt/(α2ܪt+α2*etHt*), 
and γt≡ΔetGt-1*/etHt*, which represents an adjustment for changes in the for-
eign price of gold (in periods when this price is constant, it is equal to zero).  
Equation (8) can be used to examine the offset coefficient which is the pro-
portion of an increase in US domestic credit offset by gold outflows in the short 
run. In the special case in which no changes in gold parities are expected and 
thus xt=0, and there is either perfect capital mobility so that εt=0 or near-perfect 
capital mobility in the sense that Δεt is independent of ΔDt, then (8) implies 
that the offset coefficient equals -θt. As the US stock of high powered money 
represented a substantial portion of the world stock during the Great Depres-
sion, θt was significantly less than 1.  
The conclusion of the authors is that even given perfect or near-perfect capi-
tal mobility, gold flows would not have severely constrained the Fed’s ability 
to determine the high-powered stock of money in the short run. The Fed would 
have been even less constrained under imperfect mobility in which case the 
absolute value of the offset coefficient would be smaller thanθt. American 
monetary authorities would have had more room for manoeuvre.  
This monetary model, which assumes a permanent, direct effect of the 
money stock on output and prices, by definition, rejects the possibility of a 
liquidity trap existing. 
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2. Data  
Our data are monthly and cover the 1922:1-1933:12 time periods for five vari-
ables: the real industrial production index, y (considered as a proxy of the real 
economic activity), the consumer price index, p, the M2 money supply, m, the 
short-term interest rate1, r, and the real deposits in suspended bank2, s (which is 
considered as a measure of the importance of bank failure). 
Figure 1 
 
With the exception of the interest rate, all variables are expressed in logarithms. 
The nominal M2 money supply is converted into a real variable by dividing it 
                                                             
1  Balke and Gordon (1986), Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 
2  Federal Reserve Bulletin, Sept. 1937 <http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/FRB/1937/>; 
McCallum (1990). It is also used by Bernanke (1983) as a proxy for the non-monetary in-
fluence of banking failure on economic activity. 
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by the consumer price index. Finally, the inflation rates are computed as 
growth rates of the consumer price index. 
As shown in Figure 1, the log of real industrial production began to decline 
from April 1929 to the cyclical trough in 1933:1. This sharp and most pro-
longed decline was followed by a brief recovery at the beginning of 1933. The 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) plot illustrates the most severe deflation in US 
history. Indeed, it declined by 23 percent from 1929 to 1933. In the same way 
as real industrial production, the log of the M2 money supply fell by more than 
10% from October 1929 to March 1933. The short-term interest rate was 
clearly on the decrease over the period. The sharp increase of the log of real 
deposits in suspended banks between 1930 and 1933 reflects to a large extent, 
the fall in the money supply multiplier observed during this period. Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963) explained this decline in the money supply by the series 
of banking panics which reduced the money supply and real activity through 
the money supply multiplier channel. The Hodrick-Prescott trend plot of real 
deposits in suspended banks consolidates this finding since the outbreak of 
banking panic precedes the decline in the money supply. 
Prior to investigating whether quicker reactivity of monetary policy in the 
thirties would have been the appropriate tool to fight the Great Depression, we 
need to provide an answer to a preliminary question: is it possible to identify 
episodes of liquidity trap over the period 1921-1933?  
3. Is it Possible to Identify Episodes of Liquidity Trap 
over the Period 1921-1933 and did the Fed Modify 
its Monetary Policy Rule Accordingly? 
According to Keynes (1936), a liquidity trap situation is characterized as an 
episode when the interest rate is insensitive to a move in the money supply. 
Below, we present several quotes taken from the General Theory (1936) which 
clearly identify the correct meaning of trap according to Keynes:  
Liquidity preference is defined as the relationship between the rate of interest 
and the quantity of money … The speculative motive is particularly important 
in transmitting the effects of a change in the quantity of money … Let the 
amount of cash held to satisfy the transaction and precautionary-motives be 
M1 and the amount held to satisfy the speculative-motive be M2 … Finally, is 
the question of the relation between M2 and r (Keynes 1973, 173, 196, 199, 
201). 
In this article, we will strictly refer to Keynes’ definition. We shall test, over 
the period 1921-1933, the occurrence of situations in which the interest rate is 
insensitive to a move in M2. 
Using appropriate methodology (a State Space specification of the Fed reac-
tion function) we set out in this section to test the existence of liquidity traps in 
accordance with the definition stated above. For the state space model, we 
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estimate the Fed reaction function by assuming that all the regression coeffi-
cients are time-variant. By estimating this model, the periods of liquidity trap 
which correspond to the near-zero parameter of the money supply can be de-
tected, i.e. when the interest rate does not react to variations in the money 
supply. Ultimately, we are led to question whether the Fed modified its mone-
tary policy rule accordingly.  
3.1. The Kalman Filter Estimation 
In order to test the existence of a liquidity trap (in the sense of an insensitivity 
of the interest rate to a move in the money supply), we model the interest rate 
process as: 
rt=c1+α1tyt+α2tpt+α3tmt+α4tst+ε       εt≈N(0,σε2)   (10) 
αt=αt-1+c2+vt                                       vt≈N(0,σv2)   (11) 
where αt=ሺα1t,α2t,α3t,α4tሻ. 
We assume that the dynamic of the interest rate, r is given by a time-varying 
parameters model and the coefficients αt are driven by an Auto-Regressive 
process (AR(1)). Equations (10) and (11) represent respectively the measure-
ment and transition equations. Since the liquidity trap is defined as an episode 
when the interest rate is insensitive to a move in the money supply, this corres-
ponds to the case where α3t=0. 
The estimation of all the parameters by the Kalman filter allows us to de-
termine the temporal receptivity of the interest rates to the different variables. 
The Maximum Likelihood estimates of the parameters of the models are re-
ported in Table 1. The results indicate that all parameters αit for i = 1,…4 are 
statistically significant. 
Figure 2 shows the dynamic degree of interest rate receptivity to the varia-
tions in output, price levels, money supply and suspended deposits. Over the 
period 1921-1933, the Fed was receptive to variations in all the variables with 
the exception of the real suspended bank deposits whose coefficient remains 
equal to zero over the entire period. Clearly the Fed never acted before and 
after the 1929 crisis as a lender-of-last-resort to support the banking system. 
Very interestingly, Figure 2 shows that the money supply coefficient 
reached a zero value between 1928:7 and 1929:9. This near zero money supply 
coefficient illustrates the case of liquidity trap since the interest rate is insensi-
tive to a move in the money supply. At the end of 1929, the money supply 
coefficient begins with a downward trend for few months then it stabilized for 
the rest of the period at a level previously reached between 1925 and 1927: the 
so-called “roaring twenties”. Immediately after the 1929 crisis the Fed restored 
its sensitivity to the money aggregate (M2) at the level which prevailed before 
the triggering of the crisis. This strongly suggests that in the aftermath of the 
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1929 crisis the Fed’s reaction function moved towards preventing the liquidity 
trap situation. 
Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results of the Model  
(Equations (10) and (11)) 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -2.6129 1.3239 -1.9736 0.0484 
C(2) 0.9454 0.0231 40.8219 0.0000 
 Final State Root MSE z-Statistic Prob. 
α1 0.4311 0.1863 2.3138 0.0207 α2 0.4657 0.1449 3.2135 0.0013 α3 -0.3447 0.1526 -2.2580 0.0225 α3 0.0664 0.0290 2.2834 0.0224 
Log likelihood -42.0924 Akaike info criterion 0.5856  
Parameters 3 Schwartz criterion 0.6447  
Diffuse priors 
4 
Hannan-Quinn  
criterion 
0.6096  
 
This new strategy adopted by the Fed just after the triggering of the 1929 crisis 
illustrates that the Fed acted through the interest rate channel to avert the risk of 
liquidity trap. This point is neglected in the literature which insists on the pas-
sive attitude of the Fed and its refusal to intervene by any means.  
Figure 2: Time-Varying Fed Reaction Function 
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4. How Would US Economic Activity Have Reacted 
Following an Expansionary Monetary Policy After 
the 1929 Crisis: Lessons from a SVAR Approach 
In the previous section, using an empirical reaction function, we highlighted 
that there was a change in the monetary policy rules of the Fed as early as 
1930. With this in mind, the following section is devoted to this question: how 
would the US economy have reacted consequent to an expansionist monetary 
policy?  
4.1. Methodology 
We develop a SVAR model which should allow for a simultaneous examina-
tion of the reaction of real economic activity to an expansionist monetary pol-
icy shock, had it been implemented after 1929:10. In order to build the dy-
namic structure of our SVAR approach, we use economic theory and 
econometric considerations with various types of restrictions on the structural 
parameters.  
The unit root test results, given in Table 2, show that all the series appear to 
be integrated of order one I(1). Table 3 shows the results of tests for the orders 
of co-integration. Both Trace and Eigenvalue statistics indicate that the order of 
co-integration is 3. 
Table 2: Integration Tests 
 y p m r s 
ADF test -2.06 -0.76 -1.02 -2.74 -2.82 
KPSS test  0.32  1.12  0.44  0.74  0.89 
The table shows the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Kwiatkowski et al. tests for stationarity of 
each time series. 
Table 3: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05  
Critical Value 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05  
Critical Value 
None* 0.4262 154.93 60.0614 83.3232 30.4396 
At most 1* 0.2674  71.60 40.1749 46.6785 24.1592 
At most 2* 0.1151  24.92 24.2759 18.3506 17.7973 
At most 3 0.0281   6.57 12.3209     4.28050 11.2248 
At most 4 0.0151   2.29    4.12990     2.29732     4.12990 
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
 
In light of the existence of co-integration relations among variables and since 
our primary focus is on the short-run dynamics of the system including all the 
variables, we present and estimate our Structural VAR in levels (Faust and 
Leeper, 1997). 
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The basic approach is derived from the studies of Blanchard and Quah 
(1989), Shapiro and Watson (1988), Blanchard (1989) and others on structural 
modelling. Indeed, many SVAR model identification processes define either 
short run (Kim and Roubini 2000) or long run (Blanchard and Quah 1989) 
restrictions.  
In this paper we adopt a short-term restrictions approach within the frame-
work of an open economy. Our purpose in this section is to identify the propa-
gation mechanisms in the case of the Fed’s expansionist monetary policy after 
the 1929 crisis and to analyze the contribution of this monetary shock to the US 
economic recovery. To determine the transmission mechanism shocks, we 
briefly summarize the SVAR modelling process3. 
In the first step we estimate the VAR reduced-form: 
yt=A1yt-1+A2ݕt-2+...+Apyt-p+εt      E(εtεt' )=Ω  (12) 
Where Ai are (nxn) coefficients matrix and y is a covariance stationary vector 
process. The vector εt=(ε1t,ε2t,…,εnt) is n-dimensional.  
The structural form of (1) can be written as:  
Ayt=A1
*yt-1+A2
*yt-2+…+A*pyt-p+But  (13) 
where E(ut)=0 and Eሺututሻ=In 
The relation between reduced and structural shocks is simply obtained by 
multiplying the relation (13) by A-1: 
εt=A-1But    (14) 
Equation (14) illustrates the relation between the reduced-form (disturbances) 
and the structural-form (innovations).  
The connection between these two forms is given by: 
Aj=Aj
-1Aj
-1     (15) 
Matrix A enables the instantaneous relations to be modelled, whilst B is a struc-
tural form parameter matrix. Identifying the structural vector autoregression 
requires the introduction of additional constraints since, following (14), the 
number of non-redundant elements of Ω (n(n+1)/2) is less than the overall 
number of elements in matrix A and B (2n2). The identification structure is 
therefore achieved by imposing 2n2-n(n+1)/2 restrictions, taken from economic 
theory and intended to represent  meaningful short term relationships between 
the variables and the structural shocks. 
Our system includes five endogenous variables: y is the real industrial pro-
duction index, p the consumer price index, m the M2 money supply, r the inter-
                                                             
3  For a complete mathematical presentation, see Hamilton, 1994. 
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est rate, and s the real value of deposits in suspended banks. With the exception 
of the interest rate, all variables are expressed in logarithms. We take the log of 
the deposits in suspended banks, s, as proxy of banking panic. 
The architecture of our short term restrictions is characterized by the follow-
ing structure: 
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ε=ൣεy,εp,εm,εr,εs൧ corresponds to the errors of the reduced VAR form, while the 
structural disturbances ݑy,up,um,ݑr,ݑs are, by definition (IS/LM models origi-
nated by Hicks, 1937 and their extensions, see especially Gali, 1992), aggre-
gate supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, supply monetary shocks, de-
mand monetary shocks, and banking shocks: 
εyt=b11uyt 
α21εyt+εpt=b22upt 
α31εyt+α32εpt+εmt+α34εrt+α35εst=b33umt   (18) 
α43εyt+α42εpt+α43εmt+εrt=b44urt 
α51εyt+α53εmt+εst=b55ust 
This model is exactly-identified because we impose 35 restrictions which cor-
respond to the case of five endogenous variables. 
The first row of the system (16): 
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yt=A1
*(1,1)yt-1+…+Ap
*ሺ1,1ሻyt-p+b11uyt  (19) 
specifies that, except for aggregate supply shock, all the others affect real activ-
ity with a lag (Sims and Zha, 2006). Such a restriction can be justified by the 
inter-temporal IS equation, by which interest-sensitive expenditure is prede-
termined (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999).  
The relation given by the second row: 
pt=-α22yt+A1*(2,.)yt-1+…+Ap*(2,.)yt-p+b22upt    (20) 
is consistent with the specification by which the inflation rate reacts contempo-
raneously to output shocks (Woodford, 2003). Indeed, based on Calvo (1983), 
Rotemberg (2003), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), we assume that effects 
on price changes on the remaining variables occur with a delay (except for real 
economic activity).  
The third row: 
mt=-α31yt-α32pt-α34rt-α35st+A1*(3,.)yt-1+…+Ap*(3,.)yt-p+b33umt  (21) 
corresponds to global liquidity aggregate dynamics, which is assumed to react 
contemporaneously to real income, demand aggregate, the short-term interest 
rate shock, and bank failure shocks. 
The fourth equation: 
rt=-α41yt-α42pt-α43mt+A1*(4,.)yt-1+…+Ap*(4,.)yt-p+b44urt  (22) 
represents the central bank reaction function by which the Fed reacts contem-
poraneously to movements in output, prices level and money supply. 
The last equation: 
st=-α51yt-α53mt+A1*(5,.)yt-1+…+Ap*(5,.)yt-p+b55ust   (23) 
represents the banking shocks dynamics relevant to bank suspensions and fail-
ures. 
The introduction of such shock mechanisms in our specification is prompted 
by the contribution of a series of banking panics from 1930 to 1933 to explain 
the severe decline of the money supply through the money supply multiplier. 
Indeed, as explained by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), the banking failure 
generated by the absence of Fed lender-of-last-resort action, altered the pub-
lic’s confidence, leading to a massive decline in the deposit-currency ratio. 
This naturally forced the banks to reduce in turn their loans, causing a sharp 
fall in the deposit reserve ratio. Bernanke (1983) also highlights the important 
role played by bank failures in affecting the financial intermediation process 
and hence reducing the level of real output. 
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4.2. Empirical Results  
4.2.1 Impulse Response Functions Analysis 
Figure 3: IRF 
 
We now develop our impulse/response function (IRF) analysis of the reaction 
of real economic activity to various shocks. We follow the calculation proce-
dure presented in Hamilton (1994). 
In the figure above, we display the real economic activity, estimated by im-
pulse response functions with 95% confidence intervals. The response of real 
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economic activity to an unexpected aggregate supply shock is in line with the 
literature, but only in the short term. Indeed, after only 6 months, real activity 
becomes significantly negative and remains so for the rest of the period. This 
result illustrates how difficult it is to undertake structural or cyclical policies in 
an unstable economic environment.  
The response of real activity to demand shock reflects the incidence of in-
creasing prices on output. This channel is ineffective: indeed, after 6 months, a 
shock on price negatively affects output for the rest of the period. An increase 
in prices has no effect on economic activity. In the light of these results it 
seems difficult to defend the view that a break in the expectations of deflation 
and their replacement by expectations of inflation would help to reduce real 
interest rates and trigger economic growth4. 
Apart from this, three main results emerge from our analysis:  
- Firstly, expansionist monetary policy would not have had significant effects 
on US economic growth: real output increases in the short term in response 
to an unexpected money supply shock but after 8 months it begins to die off. 
Indeed, real economic activity decreases by -4% after 18 months. This mi-
nors the role of the monetary channel as a solution to the financial crisis. 
The 1929’s great contraction would certainly have been attenuated (in the 
very short term) but not offset by expansionist monetary policy, as Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963), Bordo et al. (2002) argued. Thus, our results tend to 
minor the role of the monetary channel as a solution to the financial crisis of 
1929. 
- Secondly, the banking variable appears as a significant transmission chan-
nel of the financial crisis. The effects we observe are in line with the styl-
ized facts: indeed, banking panics significantly contributed to the emergence 
of the Great Contraction of 1929 (Bernanke 1983). Would this Great Con-
traction have been attenuated, had the Fed decided to fund the banks? This 
issue is more controversial. We find that banking failures have immediate 
adverse effects on economic growth: real activity decreases sharply in the 
first 14 months after a banking shock. But, amongst all the variables, it is the 
only one (along with the interest rate, see below) to exert positive medium 
term effects (after 14 months). Do these medium-term positive effects re-
flect the indirect incidence of expansionist monetary policy used to fight 
bank failures? A renewed intermediation is supposedly a condition for en-
hancing economic growth. But since the Fed never acted over this period as 
a lender of last resort, more plausibly this medium term positive effect may 
directly reveal a kind of “survival of the fittest” syndrome. Eliminating “bad 
banks” (and not funding them) acts as a “purge” to restore confidence in the 
banking system and improve medium term economic recovery. 
                                                             
4  C. Romer (2009). 
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- Thirdly, the incidence of increasing the interest rate suggests that “Avoiding 
the Trap” was a good policy to enhance medium term economic growth. Af-
ter 6 months, the impact of raising the interest rate on economic growth is 
almost continuously positive (except for an episode of 2 months around the 
15th month). This corroborates the underlying situation of liquidity trap at 
the very beginning of the period: expecting an increase in the interest rate, 
economic agents prefer to hoard money. This has no impact on economic 
growth over the six first months. After that, the recession is better contained 
and less persistent. Thus, an increase in the interest rate may help break the 
speculative demand for money and restore confidence in economic recov-
ery5. 
4.2.2. Variance Decomposition Analysis (VDA) 
Table 4: Variance Decomposition  
Months 
Aggregate 
supply 
shocks 
(uy) 
Aggregate 
demand 
shocks 
(uρ) 
Monetary 
supply shocks 
ሺum) 
Monetary 
demand shocks 
(ur) 
Banking 
shocks 
(us) 
2 0.75 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.02 
6 0.49 0.07 0.09 0.31 0.04 
12 0.38 0.12 0.07 0.24 0.19 
20 0.39 0.11 0.05 0.33 0.12 
 
Table 4 displays the historical decompositions of the real economic activity 
from 1929:10 to 1933:12. Columns 1 to 5 contain the portion of the real activ-
ity that can be respectively explained by aggregate supply shocks ሺuyሻ, aggre-
gate demand shocks (up), monetary supply shocks (um), monetary demand 
shocks (ur) and banking shocks (us). 
The VDA results corroborate the IRF analysis:  
- The liquidity trap constraint almost annihilates the efficiency of expansionist 
monetary policy: the contribution of the monetary supply shock is the weak-
est of all after twenty months (5%). This result calls into question the mone-
tarist claim for an increase in the money supply as a solution to the financial 
crisis.  
- The liquidity trap constraint explains why the contribution of the interest 
rate channel is so important with 33% (ranking second behind the aggregate 
supply shock with 39%).  
                                                             
5  This finding echoes Ariccia-Blanchard-Mauro’s suggestion to increase the interest rate in 
the current crisis situation. See “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy”, IMF note, 2010: “To 
prick asset bubbles before they grow dangerously large relies on raising interest rate”; “It 
would have been good to start (the current crisis) with a higher nominal rate”. 
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- We verify the contribution of the banking shocks (12%) as another relevant 
transmission channel for explaining real variations in US output. Neverthe-
less, this smaller than expected level highlights that in a liquidity trap con-
text the banking system cannot fully play its role of intermediation. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we have given empirical evidence that a situation of liquidity 
trap prevailed in the US in 1929 which in turn encouraged the Fed to adopt a 
new policy rule during the 1930-1933 period. We have called this new policy 
rule “avoiding the trap”. This innovative result which is in contrast to the exist-
ing literature on the 1929 crisis is corroborated by the simulations undertaken 
in a SVAR framework. The liquidity trap context explains why expansionist 
monetary policy would have had a limited effect on real economic activity and 
only in the very short term. The monetarist lessons from the 1929 crisis 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Bordo et al. 2002) should then be balanced out. 
In no way, could a miracle in terms of economic growth be expected simply by 
means of an expansionist monetary policy. 
Another key finding is that the channel of run deposits (“Bernanke effect”) 
was obviously linked to a liquidity trap context. Our simulations indicate that 
the Great Depression would have been better contained and less persistent 
following an increase in interest rates that break the speculative money demand 
and restore confidence in economic recovery, rather than increasing the money 
supply.  
We consider that the lessons from the Great Depression have been partially 
misunderstood. Our diagnosis of the 1929 crisis is that the banking channel was 
obviously combined with a liquidity trap context. We highlighted in a SVAR 
framework that faced with this double constraint, two policy tools were re-
quired:  
- Expansionist monetary policy proved to be inefficient in restoring economic 
growth; then, the quantitative side of monetary policy ought to be devoted to 
combat banking panics which does not mean funding “bad banks”; 
- An adequate interest rate policy means an interest rate that endeavors to 
avoid the liquidity trap. Indeed, we found that “avoiding the trap” would 
have been a decisive manner in which to foster economic growth in the thir-
ties. 
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